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Abstract
A typical kind of question in mathematical logic is that for the
necessity of a certain axiom: Given a proof of some statement φ in
some axiomatic system T , one looks for minimal subsystems of T that
allow deriving φ. In particular, one asks whether, given some system
T + ψ, T alone suffices to prove φ. We show that this problem is
undecidable unless T + ¬ψ is decidable.
There are various places in mathematical logic where one is concerned
with the necessity of certain axioms for the proof of a theorem; in set theory,
typical questions are about the necessity of the axiom of choice and large
cardinal assumptions. In arithmetic, one is interested in the minimal degree
of induction necessary for the proof of some statement. Generally, it is hard
to determine the answer. This suggests that these problems may be unde-
cidable. We show that this is indeed the case for all the cases mentioned and
in fact many more. This is in fact an easy consequence of a result of Ehren-
feucht and Mycielski (see below). To the best of our knowledge, however,
this consequence has so far not been noted or written down. The purpose of
this note is to change this.
Definition 1. The complexity of a proof is the number of symbols (quanti-
fiers, junctors, variables, constants, relation and function symbols) occuring
in it. IfB is a proof, then |B| denotes its complexity. If T is a theory and φ is a
provable statement of T , thenWT (φ) denotes min{|B| : B is a T -proof of φ}.
The main ingredient of our proof is the following result of Ehrenfeucht
and Mycielski ([EM]):
Theorem 2. If T +¬α is undecidable, then there is no recursive function f
such that WT (φ) ≤ f(WT+α(φ)) holds for all theorems φ of T .
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Theorem 3. Let T be a first-order theory and φ a statement such that T+¬φ
is undecidable. Then there is no effective procedure to decide whether, given
a proof in T + φ of some statement ψ, the statement ψ is provable in T .
Proof. Assume for a contradiction that P is a program deciding this ques-
tion. Let Q be a program proceeding as follows: Given a natural number n,
compute the set Sn of all T + φ-proofs of complexity at most n. Note that
Sn is finite and a code cn for Sn can be computed uniformly in n. Using P ,
compute (a code for) the subset Tn ⊆ Sn of all elements of Sn which prove a
statement that is also provable in T − {φ}. Using Tn, find (by exhaustively
searching through the T −{φ}-proofs) a (finite) set Bn containing a T −{φ}-
proof for each element of Tn. Finally, output max{|B| : B ∈ Bn}. Thus Q
computes, given n, an upper bound for the complexity of a T −{φ}-proof of
a statement that has a T -proof of complexity n.
Now let ψ be a statement provable in T − {φ}, let B be a T -proof of ψ and
let Q(|B|) ↓= k. Then, by construction of Q, there is a T − {φ}-proof of ψ
of complexity at most k, contradicting Theorem 2.
We note some particularly interesting special cases.
Corollary 4. 1. There is no effective procedure to decide whether a ZFC-
theorem is provable in ZF alone.
2. Assuming the consistency of some large cardinal hypothesis H , there
is no effective procedure to decide whether a ZFC + H-theorem is
provable in ZFC alone
3. There is no effective procedure that maps PA-theorems φ to the degree
of induction necessary for their proof, i.e. the smallest n such that
IΣn ⊢ φ
Proof. For (1) and (2), this follows from the observation that every consistent
recursive extension of ZF is undecidable.
Concerning (3), assume for a contradiction that P is a program that, given
a (code for) a PA-theorem ψ, outputs the smallest n such that ψ is provable
in IΣn (and does not halt when the input is not provable in PA). We use the
definability of bounded truth predicates in arithmetic to write the induction
axioms for Σn formulas as a single formula φn for each n ∈ ω. Now, every
recursive consistent extension of IΣ1 (i.e. PA
−+φ1) is undecidable. Since φ2
is not implied by IΣ1, so PA
−+φ1+¬φ2 is consistent and hence undecidable.
But, as IΣ2-theorems are PA-theorems, P easily allows us to decide whether
some theorem ψ of IΣ2 is provable in IΣ1, a contradiction to Theorem 3.
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